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Abstract
Modeling of Jet Engine Abnormal Conditions and Detection Using
the Artificial Immune System Paradigm
Jaclyn Marie Porter
Previous research at WVU has yielded promising results in the detection of aircraft subsystems malfunctions using the artificial immune system (AIS) paradigm. However, one aircraft
component that requires improvement is the aircraft propulsion system. In this research effort,
MAPSS, a non-real time low-bypass turbofan engine model distributed by NASA, has been
linearized and interfaced with the WVU F-15 model and the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom flight
simulator to provide a more complex engine model and create more options for engine failure
modeling and engine failure detection. A variety of engine actuator and sensor failures were
modeled and implemented into the simulation environment. A detection scheme based on the
AIS approach was developed for specific classes of failures including throttle, burner fuel flow
valve, variable nozzle area actuator, variable mixer area actuator, low-pressure spool speed
sensor, low-pressure turbine exit static pressure sensor, and mixer pressure ratio sensor.
A 5-dimensional feature hyper-space is determined to build the “self” within the AIS
paradigm for abnormal condition detection purposes. The WVU AIS interactive design
environment based on evolutionary algorithms was used for data processing, detector
generation, and limited optimization. Flight simulation data for system development and
testing was acquired through experiments in the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom flight simulator
over extended areas of the flight envelope. The AIS-based detection scheme was tested using
both nominal and engine failure conditions and its performance evaluated in terms of detection
rates and false alarms. As compared to the previous failure detection results, significant
improvement has been demonstrated as well as excellent potential for detection of the newly
modeled engine failures.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Problem Definition
Typically, aircraft jet engines are modeled in a very simple way for most flight simulation
and control applications using a look-up table for Mach, altitude, and throttle. Recently, the
potential of using engines to control the aircraft when standard control actuators fail has been
given a lot of attention. Many efforts are made to integrate engine control with aerodynamic
control for improved performance and fault tolerance. In general, aircraft upset conditions
(prevention, detection, and accommodation) are currently of high interest due to the increasing
concern and awareness regarding aircraft safety. There is a need for “integrated and
comprehensive” systems that solve this problem. This means that the system must be able to
handle autonomously (without human direct intervention, without switching operational
modes) abnormal conditions of “all” aircraft sub-systems, of “all” types, and over all regions of
the flight envelope. An “intelligent” control system with high fault tolerance capabilities is
needed.
Efforts at West Virginia University (WVU) in Fault tolerant control laws have led to the
development of the WVU F-15 aircraft model within the Matlab®/Simulink® environment. The
WVU aircraft simulation environment uses a graphical user interface (GUI) to allow the user to
choose the aircraft flight conditions, pilot inputs, failure scenarios, etc. for the flight. The F-15
aircraft model includes modeling of nominal flight conditions, control surface failure, sensor
failure, engine failure (which uses only a look-up table), and structural damage. This thesis
focuses on the need for more accurate engine models to be included into the existing
simulation environment and integrated into the general failure detection, identification,
evaluation, and accommodation (FDIEA) process.
Artificial Immune System (AIS) techniques are being used in an attempt to solve the
FDIEA problem. The WVU AIS design environment was developed to create, optimize, and test
immunity based failure detectors. The AIS design environment and the WVU Simulation
Environment of the F-15 aircraft model are used together to test this possible solution to the
1

FDIEA problem. Previous research has yielded promising results in the failure detection and
identification phases for many of the modeled failures.
Since the current engine model consists of a thrust look-up table, no internal engine
parameters are available to use as detectors. The existing failure detection schemes must use
aircraft dynamics to try to identify engine failure. In this paper, development of a more complex
engine model will create more options for engine failure modeling and engine failure detection.
The new linear engine model is based on a low-bypass turbofan engine, which contains many
actuators and sensors. The actuators and sensors which have the most effect on the dynamics
of the engine model will be modeled as failures. It is predicted that this will not only enhance
the accuracy of the engine model but also the failure detection. After the engine model
development, the new available parameters are used to create immunity based failure
detectors. This thesis will show improvement of the detection rates and false alarms compared
to the previous failure detection results and good potential for detection of the newly
developed engine failures.

1.2 Research Objectives
The research effort presented in this thesis was aimed at reaching the following
research objectives.
•

Develop and test a more accurate linear engine model to integrate with the WVU
F15 Matlab/Simulink® model replacing the previous engine model based only on
thrust look-up tables.

•

Develop and test various engine specific actuator and sensor failures.

•

Investigate/design detection schemes based on the Artificial Immune System. The
latest is based on a detailed analysis of interactions between failed components and
the rest of the engine, and the dynamic response of the aircraft. In other words,
analysis of how much individual engine parts affect everything else. This is useful to
eventually define the set of identifiers to be used in the AIS-based detection.

•

Compare the results of the AIS detection schemes with previous results that were
based only on the aircraft response.
2

1.3 Thesis Overview
The following chapter structure describes the organization of this thesis.
•

Chapter 2 contains the literature review, which presents descriptions of engine and
engine failure model development and various research on the subjects of AIS and
FDIE.

•

Chapter 3 introduces/discusses the WVU Simulation Environment which includes the
Simulink® model, the WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator, and the Graphical User Interface.

•

Chapter 4 describes the engine model development, including the creation of the
linear model and the description of the controller, sensor, and actuator dynamics
subsystems. This chapter also contains an example and explanation of a healthy
engine simulation.

•

Chapter 5 consists of the engine failure modeling and provides an example of an
unhealthy engine simulation.

•

Chapter 6 presents the design of the failure detection scheme including descriptions
of AIS, the self, data processing, identifiers, and detectors used for the engine
model.

•

Chapter 7 consists of the experimental procedures, which explains in detail, the
flight plans and testing, the development of the self, and the detection of failures.

•

Chapter 8 displays and discusses validation of the system as well as the results of the
AIS on the flight tests of several engine failures. New failures are examined for the
first time while others are compared to the results of previous engine failure
detection.

3

Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Engine Models
In order to create the architecture needed for a more complex engine model,
investigation into existing engine models was done. A number of models were found which
were being used for different purposes. The type of engine model needed for application in the
WVU F-15 aircraft model should represent a generic military type jet engine.
While nonlinear models may be accurate, they are typically non-real time and cannot be
used in real-time simulation and are difficult (even impossible) to be used as such for control
system design. Simpler and faster linear models must be developed from nonlinear differential
and algebraic equations for use in these applications [1]. A nonlinear engine model is
estimated, usually from test data, around an operating point to obtain a linear model. These
linear time invariant (LTI) models are used for engine control despite their limited flight
envelope.
For transient engine operations, the linear model would ideally include multiple
operating points [1]. This is done through a piecewise-linear model, which interpolates several
linear models at different operating points in the flight envelope. While the piecewise-linear
models provide greater accuracy for fast simulations, they are not convenient for controller
design since they are technically still nonlinear. “Jet Engine Model for Control and Real-Time
Simulations” [1] discussed a simple/fast quasilinear engine model based on nonlinear functions
used for controller design. Simulation results comparing nonlinear and fast models were found
to reasonably agree.
Many of the turbofan engine models and simulators used in industry are based on
numerous lookup tables and empirical data derived from real experiments [2, 3]. For the design
of low complexity gain-scheduled control laws, linear models are necessary at relevant points in
the flight envelope. Henrion et al. [4] have presented a methodology for the derivation of such
linearized models of aircraft turbofan engine dynamics from standard engine simulators used in
industry. Several versions of the Matlab linearization function linmod were used for this
4

purpose and some issues related to the performance of these algorithms were identified and
discussed. The authors also emphasized the sensitivity of model accuracy with the selection of
flight condition and excitation input.
Despite the effectiveness of engine models based on look-up tables for control design,
NASA researchers observed interest in intelligent engine component technology particularly in
the field of aircraft health management [5]. As a result, the Modular Aero-Propulsion System
Simulation, or MAPSS, was developed. MAPSS uses a nonlinear simulation of a generic turbofan
engine in Simulink® along with a GUI to create a computer aided control design and simulation
package with graphical representation of the engine systems. Validation was done using a
FORTRAN engine simulation. MAPSS provides easy access to health, engine, and control
parameters along with the option to create linear models based on the nonlinear steady-state
response to certain operating conditions for Mach, altitude, and power lever angle (PLA) [5, 6].

2.2 Engine Failure Models
For most applications, engine failure models consist of simple failures/malfunctions
based on available input parameters, such as throttle failures or reduced thrust output, etc.
Currently within the WVU F15 aircraft model are three options for engine failures [7]. The
“stuck throttle” engine failure corresponds to a functioning engine with no response to throttle
actuation. The “thrust runaway” failure represents a malfunction of the fuel control system
which reaches maximum fuel flow resulting in increased thrust. Since modeling of the fuel
control system is unavailable, this failure is modeled by increasing the throttle to maximum
over a period of time. Finally, reducing the throttle input by a constant factor represents the
“power/thrust reduced control efficiency”. It is apparent that these engine failures are modeled
based on throttle input since it is the only available parameter [7].
Clearly, once a more complex engine model is developed, more complex engine failure
models can be used. Sarkar et al. [8] discuss some aircraft engine failures on a simulation test
bed. The engine model used is similar to the NASA MAPSS model. Here, the engine failures are
based on the efficiency health parameter and the flow health parameter. Each of the six main
engine components (defined in Chapter 4) has these health parameters which affect the
5

efficiency and flow of that particular component. Once the health parameter values at healthy
conditions are obtained, the failure is created by setting the nominal condition of each
parameter at 1.0 below the healthy condition. Reducing the health parameter value below the
nominal condition represents an engine component failure [8].
With engine models such as MAPSS [6] that contain actuator dynamics and sensor
outputs, the same modeling techniques used in other engine actuator and sensor failures can
be applied. Aircraft actuator failures within the WVU F-15 aircraft model include modeling of a
stuck aerodynamic control surface where the control surface remains fixed in the current
position/deflection or moves to a user defined position at the time of failure [7]. Also within
this aircraft model are aircraft sensor failures which consist of an output bias. The sensor
output transitions to this bias either instantaneous, known as a step bias, or over a period of
time, called a drifting bias. The size of the bias (large or small) and the speed of the drift (fast or
slow) are user defined [7].

2.3 Failure Detection and Accommodation
The main purpose for building a more complex engine model is to improve the
detection of engine failures. Many failure detection schemes are being developed in an attempt
to improve safety and reliability of aircraft operations. Sarkar et al. [8, 9] present concepts for
fault detection and isolation (FDI) with application on an aircraft gas turbine model. The focus
here is detection and isolation of failures close to the time of occurrence. The FDI algorithms
used by the authors are based on symbolic dynamic filtering (SDF), which is built upon the
principles of symbolic dynamics, statistical pattern recognition, and information theory [9]. SDF
was found to be effective not only with catastrophic failures but also with small magnitude
failures. Since the engine failure model is based on health parameters, the failure can be made
to start out small and evolve over a period time. The purpose of detection of these growing
engine failures is to monitor the deterioration of different engine parts over the life of the
engine.
Another promising technique, which is in development at WVU [7], is based on the
human immune system. This concept is called the artificial immune system (AIS). AIS-based
6

failure detection is designed to distinguish parts of the system that do not belong to the “self”.
The basic idea is that an abnormal condition, or failure, is declared when the current system
does not correspond to normal conditions. Moncayo et al. [7] have used this concept with the
WVU F-15 aircraft model in an attempt to solve the fault detection, identification, and
evaluation (FDIE) problem in a variety of aircraft sensor, actuator, propulsion (engine), and
structural failures/damages over an extended flight envelope. The system’s effectiveness is
measured in terms of rates of detection and false alarms. “Detection” refers to positive
detection during the time period after the failure occurs while “false alarms” are positive
detections when no failure is present. The authors show promising potential of the AIS in the
field of aircraft sub-system failure detection and identification.
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Chapter 3: WVU Simulation Tools
3.1 General Description of the WVU Simulation Environment
An advanced simulation environment has been developed at WVU [10] to support the
design, evaluation, and validation of aircraft fault-tolerant control laws. Matlab and Simulink
are used to ensure maximum portability and flexibility. Model blocks from the Flight Dynamics
and Control (FDC) toolbox [11] are included for solving the equations of motion, and modeling
wind and atmospheric turbulence effects. The dynamic model is interfaced with the Aviator
Visual Design Simulator (AVDS) simulation package [12] to provide visual cues when used
directly on a desktop computer. The main components of the WVU simulation environment are
presented in Figure 3.1. These five modules are:
•

Aircraft Model Module

•

Control System Module

•

Aircraft Sub-System Failure Models

•

Failure Detection and Identification Schemes

•

User Interface

The high level Simulink model for the direct desktop configuration is shown in Figure
3.2.
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Figure 3.1: General Architecture of the WVU Simulation Environment

Figure 3.2: Simulink Model of the WVU Simulation Environment – Direct Desktop
Configuration
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The simulation environment can also be interfaced with the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom
flight simulator interacting with the simulator supporting software, X-Plane [13]. This
configuration, illustrated in Figure 3.3 [14], is used to perform tests in the flight simulator. The
Simulink model interfaced with the WVU 6-DOF flight simulator and X-Plane is shown in Figure
3.4.
The aircraft dynamic model can be flown using a joystick or a set of pre-recorded
command time histories. User-friendly GUI menus are used to set the conditions for the
simulation scenarios, including a variety of options related to the architecture of the control
laws, failure type and magnitude, and input/output content. An example of the user interface
provided by the AVDS visualization and the monitoring of relevant engine parameters using
Simulink® scopes is presented in Figure 3.5.

Motion Base
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Motion Base

Visual Cues
Systems
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X-Plane
Software

Other
Systems
Aircraft States and
Their Derivatives

PILOT

Simulator
Cockpit Controls

External
Computer
Stick and Pedals
Displacements

Aircraft
Model

Actuator and
Sensor Failure
Model

Control
Laws

Failure
Detection and
Identification

MATLAB
SIMULINK

Figure 3.3: Integration of the WVU Flight Simulator with External Models [14]
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Figure 3.5: Interface of the WVU Simulation Environment
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3.2 Aircraft Model
The Aircraft Model Module can be considered to include four major components: the
wind and turbulence model, the aircraft dynamic equations of motion, the aerodynamic
database, and the engine model. The development of a more accurate and flexible engine
model was a major objective of this thesis. The initial engine model within the WVU simulation
environment consisted of a simple 3-dimensional look-up table for thrust as a function of
throttle, Mach, and altitude. Chapter 4 provides details regarding the development of the new
engine model including all major internal actuators and sensors as well as the internal
dedicated engine controller.
The Dryden model implemented within the FDC toolbox was used to simulate
turbulence effects and constant wind of pre-determined direction and magnitude. The FDC
toolbox ‘Equations of Motion Solver’ was used, which implements general rigid body dynamics
assuming constant mass and inertias. The computation of aerodynamic forces and moments is
distributed for each control surface, wing, and engine. This specific feature is necessary for
modeling the failures with adequate level of generality.
The aerodynamic model was derived from a non-linear model of a high performance
military aircraft distributed by NASA to academic institutions in 1990 within a student design
competition [15]. The aerodynamic database is structured with a number of look-up tables,
which are functions of one or more dynamic variables, such as Mach number and/or angle of
attack.

3.3 Control System Model
Two general strategies for adaptive control laws are implemented within the WVU
simulation environment: indirect and direct adaptive flight control laws [10]. Indirect adaptive
flight control laws consist of optimal control design approach and frequency domain-based online parameter estimation. The direct adaptive flight control laws design is based on non-linear
dynamic inversion at a reference nominal flight condition plus artificial neural networks
augmentation to compensate for inversion errors and abnormal flight conditions. For the
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purpose of this research effort, the direct adaptive control laws were used. The engine has its
own internal controller, which will be described in Chapter 4.
As part of the general control system, the WVU simulation environment includes failure
detection identification and accommodation (FDIA) schemes for aerodynamic actuators and
sensors relying on monitoring relevant dynamic measurements, information processing based
on neural estimators, and comparison against pre-determined thresholds. In this thesis, a novel
approach is developed and analyzed for engine abnormal conditions detection based on an
artificial immune system. The detailed design and performance evaluation of this detection
method is presented in Chapters 6 and 8.

3.4 Failure Models
In this section, a brief overview of sub-system failure models previously implemented
within the WVU simulation environment is presented. The engine failure models associated to
the more accurate engine model developed for the purposes of this thesis are discussed in
detail in Chapter 5.
Two types of aerodynamic control surface failure are implemented within the WVU
simulation environment. The first failure type corresponds to an actuator mechanism failure.
The control surface remains fixed in the current or in a user prescribed position at post-failure
conditions. The second failure type corresponds to a physical destruction and/or deformation
of the control surface. It consists of a deterioration of the aerodynamic “efficiency” of the
control surface starting at the occurrence of the failure [16]. The user can select different
failure parameters such as type, occurrence time, position, and magnitude affecting any of the
individual eight control surfaces of the baseline aircraft, which is left or right stabilators,
ailerons, canards, or rudders.
All the sensors that are typically used in the control laws feedback (e.g. angular rate
sensors) have been first represented as first order systems [10]:

σ a (s) =

1
x (s)
τ ss + 1

Eq 3-1
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where σ a is a noiseless sensor output and x is the actual measured variable as it results from
the mathematical model of the aircraft. The sensor output can be expressed in general as:

σ m ( t ) = max[min (K s ( t ) ⋅ σ a ( t ) + σ b ( t ) + K d ( t ) ⋅ ( t − t f ), σ max ), σ min ] + K n ( t ) ⋅ σ n ( t )

Eq 3-2

where K s , K d , K n , and σ b are, respectively, a sensor output scaling factor, a drift factor, a
noise amplifier, and a bias. The current time is denoted by t and the moment of failure
occurrence by t f . By properly selecting values for the 8 modeling parameters ( K s , K d , K n ,

σ b , σ max , and σ min ,) the following types of sensor failures can be simulated:
•

biased sensor output with variable rate

•

drifting output

•

constant or saturated output

•

increased output noise

A simple model of wing damage was implemented considering both aerodynamic and
gravimetric effects. It is assumed that the structural damage to the wing will affect the
aerodynamic forces and moments through the reduction of the aerodynamically active area
and through the alteration of the aerodynamic characteristics in terms of stability derivatives.
These effects are modeled using two parameters, a wing area damage factor and an
aerodynamic damage factor. To model the effects of the wing damage on the gravimetric
characteristics of the aircraft, the wing area damage factor is used to proportionally reduce the
total mass of the aircraft and to alter the moments of inertia. Note that the equations of
motion are still based on the assumptions of constant mass, inertias, and center of mass
location. The effects of the non-symmetric location of the center of mass after the occurrence
of the failure are modeled as equivalent alterations of the moment coefficients.
The following engine failure/malfunction models have initially been included in the
WVU simulation environment: stuck throttle, thrust runaway, and power/thrust reduced
control efficiency. The further development of these models is presented in Chapter 5.
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3.5 Graphical User Interface (GUI)
The main portal menu, presented in Figure 3.6, allows the user to select simulation
under nominal (“healthy”) flight conditions or under abnormal operation of one of the main
sub-systems: control surfaces, airframe control system sensors, structure, or propulsion.
Different failure detection schemes can also be selected from this menu.
The menu presented in Figure 3.7, allows the user to select the source of the input to
the simulation

Figure 3.6: WVU Simulation Environment – Main Portal Menu
Should a simulation scenario at abnormal conditions be selected from the menu in
Figure 3.6 for any of the main aircraft four sub-systems, corresponding input windows are
opened to allow the user to configure the type, magnitude, and moment of occurrence of the
failure. In Figure 3.8, the input menu for the engine related failure is presented.
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Figure 3.7: Selection of Simulation Input Source

Figure 3.8: Selection of Engine Abnormal Operation Condition
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Two large categories of failures are implemented: failures related to the throttle
actuator and the command chain between the cockpit and the engine and failures affecting the
internal actuators or sensors of the engine. Three types of failure directly related to the throttle
actuator can be selected by checking the input boxes on the left side of the input window. The
options include stuck throttle at current position or at a user specified position, slow or fast
thrust runaway, and reduced control efficiency. The magnitude of such a failure can be
established on this menu as is the moment of occurrence. The specific failed element for an
internal engine failure is specified using a next window as well as the failure magnitude. Only
the time of occurrence is input here. Any of the two engines or both can be affected by the
failures.
If an internal engine actuator failure is desired, the menu presented in Figure 3.9 is
opened. It allows the user to specify which engine actuator out of seven will fail, if the failure
condition involves lockage at current situation or migration to an imposed one, and what the
magnitude of the failure is.

Figure 3.9: Set-up of Engine Actuator Failure
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If an internal engine sensor failure is desired, the menu presented in Figure 3.10 is
opened. It allows the user to specify which engine sensor out of eight will fail, the characteristic
or type of failure and the magnitude of the failure. The types of failure implemented include:
sensor output step bias (small or large), sensor output drifting bias (all combinations of large,
small, fast, and slow), and constant sensor output, either null output or saturated output at the
minimum or maximum possible value.

Figure 3.10: Set-up of Engine Sensor Failure
Simulink scopes can be used – as shown in Figure 3.5 – to monitor relevant parameters
during simulation and/or to investigate their time histories after the simulation. The menu
presented in Figure 3.11 allows the selection of the aircraft states, controls, and other variables
to be monitored. The menu presented in Figure 3.12 allows the selection of engine related
actuators and sensors, for both engines, to be monitored.
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Figure 3.11: Visualization Menu – Monitoring General Aircraft Parameters
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Figure 3.12: Visualization Menu – Monitoring Engine Actuators and Sensors
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Chapter 4: Engine Model
4.1 Jet Engine Model
The engine model developed is designed to integrate with the WVU F-15 Aircraft model;
therefore, a generic military type jet engine was chosen. Most jet fighter engines are
low/medium bypass turbofans with a mixed exhaust, afterburner, and variable area final
nozzle. Since low bypass turbofans are more effective around Mach of 0.75 and the airspeed of
the flight envelope is centered about this Mach, a low-bypass turbofan is the right selection.
The engine modeled is a gas powered, high-pressure ratio, dual spool, low by-pass, turbofan
aircraft engine with a digital controller. The engine components consist of a fan, high-pressure
compressor (HPC), burner, booster, high-pressure turbine (HPT), low-pressure turbine (LPT),
bypass duct, mixer, afterburner, and nozzle. These components are shown on the jet engine
diagram in Figure 4.1.
Booster

Fan

HPC

Burner

LPT

HPT

Afterburner

Mixer

Nozzle

Figure 4.1: Diagram of Aircraft Jet Engine [5]
Also included in Figure 4.1 are the locations where measurements are taken (i.e. areas,
temperatures, etc.) The parts of the diagram that are of main focus include 7 actuators and 8
sensors listed in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Actuator Name and Location for Aircraft Jet Engine
Actuator
Location on Figure 2.1
Main Burner Fuel Flow
WF36
Variable Nozzle Area
A8
Variable Mixer Area
A16
BP Injector Area
A14
Fan Guide Vanes
STP2
HPC Guide Vanes
STP27
Booster Guide Vanes
STP27D
Table 4.2: Sensor Name and Location for Aircraft Jet Engine
Sensor
Location on Figure 2.1
LP Spool Speed
XNL
HP Spool Speed
XNH
HPC Inlet Temperature
T27
HPC Inlet Pressure
P27
HPC Exit Static Pressure
PS3
LPT Exit Temperature
T56
LPT Exit Static Pressure
PS56
Mixer Pressure Ratio
N/A (P16/P56)
Another way to look at the system components is shown in Figure 4.2. (Flow chart from
FDI Part II) This figure also includes the actuator and sensor locations.

Figure 4.2: Flow Chart of the Different Component Interactions of the Aircraft Jet Engine [5]
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the first engine component is the fan. The fan and booster are
powered by the low-pressure turbine (LPT). One shaft called the low-pressure (LP) spool
connects these components and the LP spool speed sensor measures its speed in revolutions
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per minute, or RPM’s. The fan supplies air to the engine core as well as the bypass (BP) duct.
The air in the bypass duct mixes with the low pressure turbine exhaust before flowing through
the mixed flow nozzle. The high-pressure compressor (HPC) is driven by the high-pressure
turbine (HPT). The speed of the connecting high-pressure (HP) shaft is measured as the HP
spool speed in RPM’s.
The low bypass ratio turbofan has a multi-stage fan which develops at relatively high
pressure ratio and yields a high exhaust velocity. This low bypass ratio military type engine has
variable inlet guide vanes, which directs air onto the first rotor stage and improves the fan
surge margin in the mid-flow range [17].
An important part of the engine is the afterburner, which is a combustor located
between the turbine blades and the nozzle. The afterburner has its own specific fuel injectors.
The temperature of the exhaust gases increases significantly when the afterburner is lit creating
higher exhaust velocity and thrust. To accommodate this extra flow, the variable nozzle area
must increase. Since the afterburner uses a lot of fuel to create the thrust increase, it cannot be
used at all times [17].

4.2 Linear Engine Model
Using a nonlinear model for this project to include the main internal engine sub-systems
was not feasible. MAPSS is a non-real time model and as such cannot be interfaced with the
motion-based simulator. Besides, most of the internal structure of the model is not accessible
to a user for failure/malfunction modeling. Instead, a linear model was obtained using the
MAPSS program and was interfaced with the WVU F-15 model. MAPSS first makes profiles of
the operating conditions including the inputs (PLA, Mach, and altitude) versus time. The user
decides the profiles to use. Here, the input values are constant over time. However, in order to
get to the input values for the linear model, the values had to increase over the profiles. Figure
4.3 shows the GUI for MAPSS including the input profiles.
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Figure 4.3: Main Menu for the Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation [6]
To find the input values some trial and error was needed. The original aircraft engine
model was used to find the thrust value at Mach of 0.75 and altitude of 20000ft. This value was
26200N for both engines combined, which is equivalent to 13100N or 2945lbf. Now, the same
Mach and altitude are run in the MAPSS model with varying PLA values. The PLA is updated
until the thrust output of MAPSS matches the thrust output of the aircraft model. This was also
verified using a linear equation to find PLA. MAPSS was run with two PLA values and constant
Mach and altitude to find the net thrust, fn, at each point. For a PLA input of 26.0deg, Mach of
0.75, and altitude of 20000ft, the net thrust is 1745lbf. For a PLA input of 30.0deg, Mach of 0.75
and altitude of 20000ft, the net thrust is 2800lbf. Now the slope can be found from the
equation

Eq 4-1

24

which can be used in the linear equation
Eq 4-2
Now, b is found to be
Eq 4-3
Finally the linear equation to calculate PLA is
Eq 4-4
With the desired thrust of 2945lbf used, the PLA input should be 30.55deg. However, MAPSS
only recognizes up to the tenths; therefore, 30.5deg is used as the linearization point. The
thrust output from MAPSS is shown in Figure 4.4. The PLA value of 30.5deg reaches a steadystate thrust of 2931.5lbf. Now the engine model is linearized around Mach of 0.75, altitude of
20000ft, and PLA of 30.5deg.
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Figure 4.4: Net Thrust from MAPSS for PLA of 30.5deg, Mach of 0.75, and Altitude of 20000ft
Once the linearization is complete, MAPSS provides matrices A, B, C, and D needed for a
state-space model as well as the input, output, and state trim values. The input values, U, are
the burner fuel flow, nozzle exit area, and bypass exit area. The states, X, are the low-pressure
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rotor speed, high-pressure rotor speed, and the average hot section metal temperature, which
are determined by the PI control action in the controller. Finally, the output values, Y, are the
calculated and sensed outputs from the CLM.
Now, the new engine model is created from the linear model matrices and the main
components of the MAPSS model. The Simulink® model of the system in shown in Figure 4.5.
The ‘Controller and Sensor’ block contains the sensor dynamics, atmospheric conditions, and
the digital controller. The ‘Actuator Dynamics’ block calculates the movements of the actuators.
The inputs of this system are the PLA, Mach, and altitude from the pilot controller joystick and
the main output is the thrust, which continues through the aircraft model. However, the
actuator and sensor outputs are also used later.

Figure 4.5: Linearized Engine Model in Simulink
Finally, this linear engine model is tested using the same constant input parameters and
the MAPSS simulation. Figure 4.6 shows the net thrust output from the linear engine model
compared to the thrust output from MAPSS. The steady-state thrust response from the linear
model matches the response from MAPSS, which confirms that the linear model works.
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Figure 4.6: Plot of Net Thrust versus Time from MAPSS and Linear Engine Models
Since this linear engine model was created about three specific input points, the model
is not valid for all flight conditions. Standard atmospheric conditions apply to altitudes up to
30000ft, where the values for temperature and pressure will begin to change. For these tests,
the flight envelope is limited to approximately 30000ft. Also, the PLA levels for the MAPSS
system are low, medium, and high [5]. Since the operating point is 30.5, the joystick throttle
input must be converted to a linear PLA value. Since 37.5 is the upper limit for the medium
power level and testing shows that 21.0 is the minimum option, the PLA input must stay within
this range. The PLA value of 30.5 must correspond to zero throttle input; therefore the
minimum and maximum PLA input is between 23.5 and 37.5deg, respectively. This means that
there is never a true maximum thrust for the system and it doesn’t quite react the way the
actual engine would.

4.3 Example of Healthy System Simulation
To gain perspective on the dynamics of the engine model, testing was performed to
show the response to standard throttle inputs. The output plots of this test show how each
parameter reacts to the given input. This shows which parameters are more likely to be
affected by the failure inputs later and which may not be affected at all. It is important to note
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that many of the parameter responses resemble second order responses as opposed to
expected first order responses. There was a question as to whether this was due to inaccuracy
of the linearized model or the engine modeling of the actuator and sensor dynamics. Additional
tests were performed which confirm that the responses are valid for the PLA inputs used.
The first of the plots for nominal conditions is in Figure 4.7, which includes the single
engine thrust, velocity, and altitude. As shown in the figure, the thrust output follows closely
along with the throttle input. The velocity remains close to constant while the throttle is at 50%
and increases or decreases while the throttle is increased or decreased. The altitude also shows
a response even though the other pilot controls were held steady. However, the change is
within about plus or minus 5 ft so it is only minor.
The next plot, Figure 4.8, contains the response of four of the seven actuators, which
consist of the burner fuel flow, the nozzle throat area, the aft VABI (mixer) area, and the bypass
injector area. As the plot shows, the burner fuel flow follows the path of the throttle deflection
with some overshoot. This is because the throttle controls the fuel to the burner in order to
increase or decrease the thrust. As explained in Chapter 2, an increase in thrust corresponds to
an increase in the volume of flow through the engine, and an increase in the nozzle area is
required to compensate. Therefore, the nozzle area also follows the path of the throttle input.
Next, the mixer area has peaks that correspond to the changes in the throttle but remains semiconstant while the throttle is constant, despite the magnitude. Also shown is that the area
decreases or increases as the throttle change is positive or negative, respectively. The bypass
injector area shown as the last subplot in Figure 4.8 remains constant throughout the test. This
is due to the fact that the bypass area is an either all or nothing deal. Once the PLA input
triggers the area to open the area is 150.8. This area will remain until the PLA decreases enough
to trigger the area to close [5]. Due to initial conditions, the area will always begin at the open
position. Now, say the threshold to trigger opening is 30deg and the threshold to trigger closing
is 25deg. Once the area is open, the PLA will have a decrease drastically to reach the value to
close. At that point the area will remain closed until the open threshold is met again.
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Figure 4.7 Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (1)
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Figure 4.8: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (2)
The next figure contains the response for the remaining actuators, including the fan
stator vanes, the HPC stator vanes, and the booster stator vanes. All of these guide vanes follow
the opposite profile from the throttle input, whereas the angle of each actuator decreases as
the throttle increases, remains mostly constant as the throttle does, and increases as the
throttle decrease.
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Figure 4.9: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (3)
Figure 4.10 displays the response of the LP spool speed, HP spool speed, HPC inlet
temperature, and LPT exit temperature sensors. The profiles of the LP spool speed, HP spool
speed and HPC inlet temperature all have the same profile as that throttle input. The spool
speeds logically follow the path of the throttle since they drive the compressor and turbines.
Increased spool speed will increase air flow to increase thrust and vice versa. The LPT exit
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temperature, however, remains fairly constant with spikes corresponding to the throttle
changes.

Figure 4.10: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (4)
The final plot for healthy conditions is Figure 4.11 which contains the responses of the
sensors pertaining to pressure. Each of the pressure sensors also follows the profile of the
throttle input. The pressure in the engine increases and decreases as the throttle does. The
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bottom subplot is for the mixer pressure ratio response. This sensor remains at approximately
1.05 for all constant throttle inputs and has spikes when the throttle changes. These spikes will
initially decrease as the throttle increases and vice versa.

Figure 4.11: Standard Throttle Input Response at Nominal Conditions (5)
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Chapter 5: Engine Failure Model
5.1 Types of Failures
The failures on the engines include stuck throttle, thrust runaway, reduced efficiency,
stuck engine actuator, and biased and stuck engine sensor. The failures can be applied one at a
time on either the left engine, right engine, or both engines. The time of the failure is inputted
into the GUI as well as the parameters needed for the particular failure. Descriptions of each
failure follow.
The stuck throttle failure implies normal operation of the engine but no response to
power lever actuation. In the case of stuck throttle at current position the throttle κ ( t )
remains constant at the value reached at the moment of failure occurrence t f :

 pilot input

κ (t ) = 
κ (t f )

for t < t f
for t ≥ t f

Eq 5-1

For the stuck at imposed position option, the user provides a throttle value between 0.0 and
1.0 at which the throttle remains constant for t ≥ t f .
The thrust runaway failure models a malfunction of the fuel control system, which
causes the increase of the fuel flow to maximum and the increase of the thrust as a result. This
is modeled by increasing the throttle to maximum with first order dynamics and time constant
set-up by the user.

 pilot input ,

κ ( s ) = κ max − κ (t f )
+ κ (t f ),
 τ s +1
ef


for t < t f
for t ≥ t f

Eq 5-2

The power/thrust reduced control efficiency is modeled by scaling down the throttle
input by a constant factor selected by the user.

 pilot input
 K ef ⋅ ( pilot input ), K ef ≤ 1

κ (t ) = 

for t < t f
for t ≥ t f

Eq 5-3

For K ef = 0 , total loss of power is simulated.
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The first three failures mentioned directly affect the thrust of the engine without
involving the other components of the engine model. The engine actuators and sensors failures
on the other hand, are somewhat more complex affecting the other actuator and sensors in the
engine and along with the thrust.
The actuators used in the failure model include the burner fuel flow, nozzle area, mixer
area, BP injector area, fan guide vanes, HPC guide vanes, and booster guide vanes. The options
for the failure are an inputted value for the fuel flow (lbm/hr), locked at current or imposed
values for the areas (in2), and locked at current or imposed deflections for the guide vanes
(deg). Each actuator block within the engine model contains a failure block. This block
continues with normal operation of the engine but with no response to the power lever
actuation. For option involving imposed values, the actuator goes to and remains at that
constant value for t ≥ t f . Similarly, the actuator remains constant at the value reached at the
time of failure for the current position option. For example, the area, A(t), is

 pilot input for t < t f
A(t ) = 
for t ≥ t f
 A(t f )

Eq 5-4

The sensors failures were applied to eight of the 22 sensors in the engine model. These
particular sensors were chosen because they are involved in the control of the engine model.
The sensors included are the LP spool speed, HP spool speed, HPC inlet temperature, LPT exit
temperature, HPC inlet pressure, HPC exit static pressure, LPT exit static pressure at mixer and
mixer pressure ratio. The options to apply to the sensors are a large or small step bias; large or
small fast drifting bias; large or small slow drifting bias; or a constant value of 0, minimum, or
maximum.
The minimum and maximum are based on the individual sensor. For the constant value
failures, the measured sensor output, σ m (t ) , goes to and remains at the selected constant
value (0, σ max , or σ min ) for t ≥ t f . The bias of the sensor output, σ b is defined as

0

σ b (t ) =  K d (t − t f )
 σ
b


for t < t f
for t f ≤ t < t f + ∆t
for t ≥ t f + ∆t

Eq 5-5
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In Eq 5-5, K d is the drifting factor, σ b is the magnitude of the bias and ∆t is the time interval
to reach to the bias. The drifting factor is represented by

0
K d (t ) = 
Kd

for t < t f
for t ≥ t f

Eq 5-6

where K d is

Kd =

σb
∆t

Eq 5-7

For the case of a step bias sensor failure, K d and ∆t are 0, and σ b is simply 0 or σ b . The
general formula to represent the measured sensor output is

σ m (t ) = max(min (σ a (t ) + σ b (t ), σ max ), σ min )

Eq 5-8

where σ a is the actual sensor value, and σ min and σ max are the thresholds of the sensor.

5.2 Example of Unhealthy System Simulation
With the engine failure models in place, it is important to see how each one affects the
nominal flight conditions. Using the same standard throttle input as for the healthy data, the
response of the healthy engine versus the unhealthy engine is plotted. Since there are so many
parameters to plot, only one example is discussed in this section. The failure responses of the
other failures can be found in Appendix A. In this section, failure of the burner fuel flow valve is
displayed and discussed. For the following plots, a left engine burner fuel flow failure at 0lbm/hr
is injected into the simulation at 5sec. This is a strong failure; therefore, the effects on the
parameters are large and easy to see. Since this is such a strong failure, however, the engine
model cannot properly model all of the parameters, so the values will go to the thresholds of
the model.
In Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.5, the failed left engine is represented by a solid line while
the healthy right engine is shown as a dotted line. Figure 5.1 has the results for the burner fuel
flow, throttle input, and thrust output. While the right engine follows the throttle input as it did
before, the left engine quickly reaches 0lbm/hr for the burner fuel flow and approximately 700lbf for the thrust. The thrust in this case is negative due to the engine creating only drag
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after the failure, since a fuel flow failure at 0lbm/hr essentially turns off the engine. The rest of
the parameters in Figure 5.2 through Figure 5.5 react in a similar way, as expected. The right,
healthy engine carries on following basically the same profiles as before while the actuators
and sensors of the left, unhealthy, engine reach a constant values shortly after the failure and
remain there throughout the test.

Figure 5.1: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (1)
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Figure 5.2: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (2)
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Figure 5.3: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (3)
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Figure 5.4: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (4)
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Figure 5.5: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (5)
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Chapter 6: Failure Detection
6.1 Artificial Immune System
Living organisms are endowed with mechanisms that detect intruding pathogens and
destroy them to protect the host from diseases. This important function is performed by the
biological immune system. In particular, so-called T cells are produced in the thymus [18] that
exhibit features that are unlike any cell in the organism. These features are strings of organic
chemical compounds, which are produced during a quasi-random cell generation process.
Those T-cells who end up having such strings that are similar to the ones of the organism, are
destroyed. The ones that are different are allowed to mature and then released into the blood
stream. This process is referred to as negative selection. If these T-cells encounter another cell
that matches their own chemical string, then they have encountered a cell that does not belong
to the organism and they mark it for destruction.
The operation of the biological immune system generated the idea to use similar
mechanisms for fault detection for engineering systems. If a current configuration of “features”
(current measured data that play the role of the intruding cell) matches any configuration (Tcell), referred to as a detector, known NOT to be a normal condition, then an abnormal
condition or failure may be declared. These “features” can include various sensor outputs,
states estimates, statistical parameters, or any other information expected to be relevant to the
behavior of the system referred to as the “self”. All regions of the hyperspace defined by the
“features” that do not belong to the “self” are referred to as “non-self”. Extensive experimental
data are necessary to determine the “self” or the region of the hyperspace corresponding to
normal conditions. Adequate numerical representations of the self/non-self must be used and
the data processed such that they are manageable. The detectors must then be generated and
optimized and finally, detection logic must be designed for real time operation with high
detection rate and low number of false alarms.
The Artificial Immune System (AIS) - as a new computational paradigm in artificial
intelligence – has been applied in recent years to solve a large variety of problems, such as
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anomaly detection [19, 20], pattern recognition [21, 22], data mining [23], computer security
[24, 25], adaptive control [26, 27], and fault detection [29]. The immunity-based fault detection
for aircraft has also been investigated [28, 29].
An integrated framework for the detection, identification, and evaluation of a wide
variety of sensor, actuator, propulsion, and structural failures/damages using the bio-immune
system metaphor has been formulated and implemented at WVU [30]. Interactive
computational tools based on evolutionary algorithms have been developed for the generation
and optimization of artificial immune system-based failure detectors using the negative
selection strategy [31]. The utility performs the design of an AIS in three different phases. A
preliminary phase consists of processing data from flight simulation tests for “self” definition
through normalization, duplicate removal, and clustering. A first phase of the evolutionary
algorithm produces a sub-optimal set of detectors. An iterative algorithm generates detectors
that do not overlap with the “self” and achieve a prescribed level of coverage of the “non-self”.
A second phase consists of a classic genetic algorithm that optimizes the set of detectors based
on three criteria. These criteria are: minimum number of detectors, minimum overlapping
between detectors, and maximum coverage of the “non-self”.
The main steps in generating and using AIS-based detectors for engine abnormal
condition detection are (see also Figure 6.1):
1. Definition of “features” or “identifiers” that define the operation of the system and
are capable of capturing the signature of the failures that must be detected.
2. Acquisition of flight simulation data at nominal conditions over a desired region of the
flight envelope for AIS training and validation (determination of false alarms). Acquisition of
flight simulation data at abnormal conditions (with failures) for detection scheme testing and
evaluation (determination of detection rates).
3. Flight simulation data processing for self definition.
4. Generation of detectors through negative selection.
5. Detection scheme formulation and testing using data at failure conditions.
Note that within this thesis, only failure detection has been addressed.
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Detectors within a Structured
Detection Logic

Abnormal Condition
Detection Scheme

Figure 6.1: Artificial Immune System-Based Abnormal Condition Detection [30]

6.2 Selection of Features for the Definition of Self
The selection of the features for the definition of the self is a critical process for the
success of the detection scheme, which will depend on the capability of these selected
parameters to capture the dynamic signature of all failures targeted.
A list of candidate features has first been formulated. It included throttle input, thrust,
the seven engine actuators and the eight engine sensor outputs available within the engine
model. Simulation of failures affecting the throttle, three engine actuators, and three engine
sensors has been performed and the effects on candidate features analyzed. These effects were
evaluated on a four-level scale, major (+++), moderate (++), minor (+), insignificant (0) as shown
in Table 6.1. A list of 5 successful candidates was then selected such that the signatures of all
failures considered are likely to be captured. The selected features are:
•

Throttle Command

•

Mixer Area Actuator

•

Fan Guide Vane Deflection

•

HPC Exit Temperature Sensor

•

Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor
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Table 6.1: Effect of Actuator and Sensor Failure on Engine Parameter Measurements
Candidate
Feature

Stuck
Throttle

Thrust

+++

Stuck
Burner
Fuel Flow
Valve
+++

Stuck
Nozzle
Area

Stuck
Mixer
Area

+

+

Faulty
LPT Exit
Pressure
Sensor
+

0

Faulty
LP Spool
Speed
Sensor
+

Throttle

+++

+++

+

+

+

0

+

Burner Fuel
Flow
Nozzle Area

+++

+++

+

+

++

+

+

++

+++

++

+

+++

+++

+

Mixer Area

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

0

Fan Vanes

++

++

++

+

+++

+

+++

HPC vanes

+++

+++

++

+

++

+

+

Booster
Vanes
LP Spool RPM

+++

+++

++

+

+++

+

+

+++

+++

+

+

+++

+

+

HP Spool RPM

+++

+++

+

+

++

+

+

HPC Inlet
Temperature
LPT Exit
Temperature
HPC Inlet
Pressure
HPC Exit
Pressure
LPT Pressure

+++

+++

+

+

0

+

+

++

++

+

0

+++

0

++

+++

+++

+

0

+

+

0

+++

+++

+

+

+

+

0

+++

+++

++

+

+++

+

+

++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

Mixer
Pressure Ratio

Faulty Mixer
Pressure
Ratio Sensor

6.3 Data Processing and Detector Generation
The WVU AIS interactive design environment [31] developed in Matlab was used for the
purpose of this research effort. The main portal to the WVU AIS design environment is
presented in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Main Menu of the WVU AIS Design Environment [31]
The WVU AIS Design Environment goes through a step-by-step process leading to the
detectors, or antibodies, of the system. The first step is to load and process the raw data from
the nominal flight tests. In the case of building the self, “processing” the data translates to
normalizing and removing the duplicate data points. The duplicate elimination is performed
because multiple data at the same point are undesirable and unneeded. Having duplicate data
points will unnecessarily increase the computational effort. The menu for this procedure is
shown in Figure 6.3. Since several tests at nominal conditions were included in the self, some of
the data were merged before processing. However, the processing was not simply performed
on the set of all data because the resulting file was too large. In order for the detection
generation process to work correctly, all of the different data sets had to be normalized to the
same factors. The maximums and minimums were found by merging all of the data together
and performing only the normalization. Then the multiple merged data sets were processed
individually using these same values so that all of the sets were consistent.
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Figure 6.3: Data Processing Menu
The next step toward creating the self is to cluster the processed data. The menu for this
is shown in Figure 6.4. The processed data are loaded and then the user chooses the
parameters for clustering, for which the values chosen are based on previous research. Once
clusters are generated for all sets of training data, the clusters are merged together. This can
also be performed in the AIS design environment.
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Figure 6.4: Clustering Menu
With the final set of clusters created, the total number being about 13600, the detector
generation can begin. First, the merged cluster file is loaded into the program. Then, Negative
Selection and Create Detectors (Phase I only) are chosen from the Detector Optimization menu.
The menu for Phase I is shown in Figure 6.5. Using only Phase I means that detectors are only
generated and no optimization is performed. For the antibodies, the shapes were spheres with
variable radii. The maximum number of detectors was set to 1000, but the final number of
detectors was 991. These detectors can now be validated and applied to the failure tests. This is
done using the detector testing menu with the options shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.5: Detector Generation Menu for Phase I
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Figure 6.6: Detection Testing Menu
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Chapter 7: Data Acquisition
7.1 Flight Plan
In previous research using the artificial immune system paradigm at WVU [32], the flight
data used to train the self included all paths of the flight envelope shown in Figure 7.1. To
validate the system, flight tests were performed at points A, B, C, and D and then run through
the detection scheme. The results showed that training the AIS for the surrounding flight paths
(numbered points) was sufficient to cover the area in between the lines (lettered points) [32].
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Altitude (ft)

D

20000

8

A

7
0.6

4

1

C
10000

3

B

6
0.75

5
0.9

Mach Number

Figure 7.1: F15 Flight Envelope
For this experiment, the research was pushed farther to see if using only the center lines
including points one, two, four, six and eight to train the system would be sufficient to create
an accurate self. In other words, the pilot would start at point 1, accelerate to point 4,
decelerate to point 8, return to point 1, ascend to point 2, descend to point 6, and return to
point 1. Typical maneuvers were performed throughout these tests. Actually, the test was
broken in two to keep the data files smaller and from having to repeat long tests in case of
error.
Preliminary testing showed that training the system on paths one to two to six and one
to four to eight did not contain all data needed to sufficiently cover flight from point one to
three. Therefore, flight paths one to two to three and one to four to three were included in the
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training data and resulted in low false alarms. The validation results are farther discussed in
Chapter 8.
In every test, the pilot performed three thrust doublets and three yaw doublets at
different magnitudes/speeds. Since the engine performance was in question, the most
important maneuvers came from the throttle and yaw inputs. The throttle controls the function
of the engine while the difference in thrust from the healthy and unhealthy engines affects
yaw; therefore, normal function of these maneuvers was needed.
The same process was used to test several engine failures. Each failure was performed
along the paths one to two to six and one to two to six including the doublets at each point. All
of the failures were performed on the left engine with some failures also performed on the
right engine. This showed, as expected, that there was no difference between the two.

7.2 Flight Testing
All flight testing was performed by student and faculty volunteer pilots in the WVU 6
degrees-of-freedom flight simulator. The WVU Motus 600 Flight Simulator, shown in Figure 7.2,
was manufactured by Fidelity Flight Simulation, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA. The components of the
simulator include
•

6 DOF motion platform driven by electrical induction motors

•

Laminar Research X-Plane flight simulation software

•

LCD mosaic wall four-monitor external visual display

•

Instructor operating station

•

Computer and control cabinet
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Simulator Cabin

External Visual Displays
Instructor Console

Computer Cabinet

Access Platform
Figure 7.2: WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator
The motion based platform shown in Figure 7.3 provides six-degrees-of-freedom
translational and rotational motion cues. Electrical motors are used to drive the motion base,
which represents a very versatile and inexpensive solution to this type of application. Motion
drive algorithms convert the motion of the aircraft as resulting from the dynamic model into
motion of the platform such that the perception of the pilot is optimized within the physical
limitations of the ground based simulator.

Figure 7.3: WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator Flight Cabin System
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The WVU Flight Simulator works with a commercial aircraft simulation package called XPlane [13]. X-Plane features high capabilities and flexibility in selecting the simulation scenario.
The 2-seat cockpit, shown in Figure 7.4 houses dual controls and instrument clusters. 6 LCD
displays visually present information in the cockpit. Two of these visual displays are dedicated
to the instrument clusters while the other four provide external (environmental) visual cues.

Figure 7.4: Visual Displays, Controls, and Instrument Cluster
The instructor console previously illustrated in Figure 7.2 has two visual displays to
monitor the simulation and to perform simulation scenario set-ups/changes. A better view of
the instructor operating station located on the access platform is shown in Figure 7.5.
Server Monitor

Instructor Station
Monitor

Motion Control
Box
Figure 7.5: Instructor Console
The large black aluminum cabinet next to the cabin in Figure 7.2 houses all electrical and
computing hardware. Five computers are used to operate the WVU Flight Simulator. Computer
#1 drives the left 45° visual display. Computer #2 drives the left and right forward visual
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displays. Computer #3 drives the right 45° visual display. Computer #4 is the “Server” computer
and runs the core flight simulation software and the pilots’ instruments. All simulation data to
be used for analysis is stored on this computer. Computer #5 is the instructor’s operating
station. All 5 computers can be controlled using the keyboard on the instructor’s desk. All
functions of the motion base can be controlled through a separate Motion Control Box, also
shown in Figure 7.5.
A total of 34 flight simulator tests with three different pilots have been performed for
the purpose of the project, adding up to approximately 20 hours of testing including integration
of engine model with flight simulator, pilot preliminary training, simulator preparation, and
data retrieval. Pilot #1 performed approximately 13 hours of the testing while Pilot #2 and Pilot
#3 performed about 6 hours and 1 hour, respectively.
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Chapter 8: Simulation Results and Discussion
8.1 Validation at Nominal Conditions
In all the figures showing testing results within this chapter, the top subplot shows the
normalized data for all the identifiers used to build the self. These parameters include the
throttle command, mixer area, fan guide vanes, HPC temperature, and mixer pressure ratio.
The plots typically show more variation of the parameters during the doublets and smoother
sections while the pilot accelerated, etc., to a new point in the flight envelope. It is important to
note that the throttle command is represented by the joystick signal with inverted sign as well
as normalized between 0 and 1; therefore, when the value is low or decreasing, the pilot was
accelerating. The bottom subplot shows the number of antibodies (or detectors) that detected
failure over a previous time window of 1 second. When the plot shows a zero value then no
abnormal condition is detected, while a non-zero value means exactly the opposite. The highest
value of activated antibodies is always 50 since the sampling rate used in the detection scheme
was 50Hz.
The flight test for validation of the AIS at nominal conditions consisted of doublets
performed at point 1, acceleration and ascension to point 3, and doublets performed at point 3.
The data from this test was normalized and used to test the antibodies. An attempt was first
made to determine the level of robustness of the data acquisition process in capturing self
characteristics over extended regions of the flight envelope. Preliminary research has shown
that data acquired over the contour of the box in Figure 7.1 plus the internal cross-like
segments were enough to represent the self at all points inside the box. Therefore, a first self
was obtained based on tests along the cross-like segments only. This preliminary self created
from the training data resulted in the generation of 1000 antibodies. The results of the
validation flight test using the first set of antibodies are shown in Figure 8.1. These results show
the number of false alarms to be very high, approximately 62%. Also shown in Figure 8.1 is the
fact that the false alarms do not occur during flight at point 1, where training data was
available, but rather in the vicinity of point 3. The rate increased shortly after acceleration and
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ascension to point 3 began (around 250sec). This preliminary test shows that the generation of
the self must include additional information at flight conditions close to point 3.

Detection Rate = NaN% False Alarms = 61.8089%

Normalized Identifier Data

1

Throttle Command
Mixer Area
Fan Guide Vanes
HPC Temperature
Mixer Pressure Ratio

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0

100

200

300

400
Time (sec)

500

600

700

Activated Antibodies

60

False Alarm

50
40
30
20
10
0

0

100

200

300

400
Time (sec)

500

600

700

Figure 8.1: Preliminary False Alarms for Left Engine Validation Data for Flight Path 1 to 3
To more clearly understand this conclusion, the 2-D plots in Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3 are
used to illustrate the difference in the points included in the self and points from the validation
data for the left engine. Figure 8.2 shows that about half of the red validation data points are
within the green cluster data, which represents the nominal flight at point 1. The other section
of data corresponding to the vicinity of point 3 is outside of the self, which the antibodies
viewed as unhealthy flight data causing the false alarms. Figure 8.3 uses two different

57

identifiers to show the same results with about half of the validation data outside of the self
cluster data.
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Figure 8.2: Normalized Validation Data compared to Self Cluster Data for Throttle Command
versus Mixer Area
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Figure 8.3: Normalized Validation Data compared to Self Cluster Data for Fan Guide Vanes
versus HPC Temperature
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Since these preliminary results clearly show that the training data was not adequate to
create an accurate self, more training was added around point 3 of the flight envelope. This
data included two flight tests. One flying from point one to 2 to 3 with the doublets performed
at point 3 and another from 1 to 4 to 3 with doublets at point 3. The new antibodies created
from this data yielded the results shown in Figure 8.4. Note that the validation data used in this
test was the exact data used in Figure 8.1. With false alarms of less than 0.6%, the validation
results are excellent.

Detection Rate = NaN% False Alarms = 0.5348%
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Figure 8.4: False Alarms for Left Engine Validation Data for Flight Path 1 to 3
The new 2-D plots are also included in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 to show the difference
from the previous self. Although not all of the validation data is included in the self, enough is
added to significantly decrease the number of false alarms and increase the validity of the self.
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This also shows that only training the system for the middle part of the flight envelope is not
adequate to represent the flight at the other points. It does, however, show that continuing to
train around the outside of a section can be enough to represent flight in the middle. This result
confirms the level of “robustness” previously determined in the acquisition of data for self
definition.
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Figure 8.5: Normalized Validation Data compared to New Self Cluster Data for Throttle
Command versus Mixer Area
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Figure 8.6: Normalized Validation Data compared to New Self Cluster Data for Fan Guide
Vanes versus HPC Temperature

8.2 Throttle Failure
One of the strongest engine failures is the throttle stuck at zero. This means close to
zero thrust will be produced by the unhealthy engine. This failure should be easily detected due
to its impact on the engine functionality. Another reason to analyze this failure was to compare
it with the detection rate using the previous engine model. The stuck throttle failure was
performed on both the left and right engines. In this case, the failure was too strong to
accelerate or ascend to other points of the flight envelope; therefore, the flight tests were
broken into sections. These figures are set up like the previous figures for validation. The only
difference is now the detection rate is included with the false alarms. The green part of the
bottom subplot on each figure represents the false alarms that occur during nominal flight
before the failure is injected. The number of false alarms must remain low for all failure tests to
justify the AIS. The red section of the subplot represents detection of the failure. Basically, the
more red area shown in the plot, the better the detection rate. Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 show
the stuck throttle detection at point one of the flight envelope. Figure 8.7 for the left engine
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shows a good detection rate at just under 95% with no false alarms. The right engine also had
good results with no false alarms and over 90% detection rate. The only gaps in these two plots
seem to come when the throttle is decreasing, which coincides with engine burnout. This may
be corrected by including a temperature sensor as an identifier to detect the decrease in
temperature during burnout.
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Figure 8.7: Left Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1
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Detection Rate = 90.9254% False Alarms = 0%
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Figure 8.8: Right Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1
The next part of the flight envelope to be tested includes points 4 and 8, corresponding
to changing Mach and constant altitude. The failure occurs at 60sec in these tests in order to
give the pilot time to accelerate to point 4 first since the speed decreases rapidly after the
failure. Figure 8.9 shows the results of the left engine failure. The detection rate here is still
high at about 86% with very low false alarms of 3%. The small number of false alarms is most
likely due to the sudden pilot acceleration while the gap in the detection was during steady
deceleration to point 8, which may not have had enough throttle excitation to show the failure.
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Figure 8.9: Left Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8
Figure 8.10 shows similar results for the right engine with a detection rate of about 80%
but with zero false alarms. The breaks in detection again correspond to deceleration to point 8
and the decreasing part of the throttle doublets.
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Figure 8.10: Right Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8
The final section of the flight envelope to test includes points 2 and 6, which holds Mach
steady and varies the altitude. The failure occurs at 240sec for this test since the pilot had to
climb before the failure. The detection rate this time was smaller than before, but still a solid
value at 67% with very low false alarms. These false alarms correspond to the initial pilot
maneuvers while the decrease in the detection rate matches the time when the pilot slowly
descends to point 6. Here, there is basically no pilot input while the aircraft goes to the new
altitude.
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Figure 8.11: Left Engine Stuck Throttle Failure at 240sec for Flight Path 2 to 6
All of these results can be compared to the previous engine failure detection rates and
false alarms. The most comparable scenario to evaluate the improvement of the AIS failure
detection is the 98% reduced efficiency engine failure for the reduced flight envelope [32]. The
thrust data from the throttle failure tests show that the failed engine was functioning at
approximately 13% of the healthy engine and therefore corresponds to an 87% reduced
efficiency engine failure. Comparison of the detection schemes is included later in this chapter.
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8.3 Engine Actuator Failures
Several actuator failures were tested in the flight simulator to find the detection rate
and number of false alarms. The actuator failure included the burner fuel flow stuck at 0lbm/hr,
the nozzle area locked at the area at the time of failure, and the mixer area locked at the area
at the time of failure.

8.3.1 Burner Fuel Flow Valve Failure
The most beneficial test here was the burner fuel flow. This failure was much like the
stuck throttle failure and can be easily compared to previous research results. Setting the
burner fuel flow to 0, however, was a stronger failure in the fact that the thrust from the
unhealthy engine was negative, since the engine was producing drag. The burner failure was
tested for both the left and right engines. The following figures show the results.
Figure 8.12 and Figure 8.13 both test a left engine failure at 60sec for flight at point one
while Figure 8.14 contains the results of the right engine failure. Both of the left engine tests
and the right engine test have very high, over 99.9%, detection rates with no false alarms. The
detection performance for this type of failure may be evaluated as excellent.
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Figure 8.12: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1
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Figure 8.13: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1
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Figure 8.14: Right Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 40sec for Flight at Point 1
The flight tests to cover points 4 and 8 of the flight envelope have the same results as
point 1. The failure in Figure 8.15 and Figure 8.16 for the left and right engine, respectively,
occurs at 60sec to allow the pilot time to accelerate before the failure. With detection rates
over 99.9% and zero false alarms, the results of these flight tests are outstanding.
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Figure 8.15: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8
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Figure 8.16: Right Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 60sec for Flight Path 4 to 8
The final test for the burner fuel flow area involves flight at points 2 and 6. In this case,
the failure in implemented at 480sec. This allows the pilot to ascend to point 2 more slowly and
hopefully decrease the false alarms compared to Figure 8.11. This is successful with false alarms
of less than 1% and detection again over 99.9%. These results will later be compared to the
previous research. Even though this failure is somewhat stronger, it is still comparable to the
failed throttle results. The equivalent reduced engine efficiency failure would be at
approximately 113%.
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Figure 8.17: Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow Failure at 480sec for Flight Path 2 to 6

8.3.2 Nozzle Area Actuator Failure
While failure of the nozzle area does not have as big of an impact on the flight as the
previous failures, the actuator controlling the nozzle area is an important part of the engine;
therefore, detection of the actuator malfunction is desired. The results from the flight tests are
shown in Figure 8.18 for a left engine failure along the path from 1 to 4 to 8. The detection rate
appears to be very low for this type of failure; however, the same failure is detected at a very
good rate of 55% with no false alarms if it occurs at different flight conditions as shown in
Figure 8.19. This result suggests that although the set of features selected to define the self is
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adequate, the detector generation process failed to produce detectors in regions of the hyper
space corresponding to the flight path 1-4-8. This may be due to a too “generous” clustering
process with the inclusion of large “empty spaces” and/or to low coverage of the non-self
during the detector generation. In both situations, areas of the non-self are considered normal
and therefore lead to poor detection. The complete optimization of the detector set using both
phase I and phase II of the evolutionary algorithm [ref] is expected to considerably improve the
detection in this area of the flight envelope.
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Figure 8.18: Left Engine Nozzle Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8
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Figure 8.19: Left Engine Nozzle Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6

8.3.3 Mixer Area Actuator Failure
Next, the actuator controlling the mixer area was locked at the current position. This
failure had good results for all tests, which are shown in Figure 8.20, Figure 8.21, and Figure
8.22. The flight path from point 1 to 4 to 8 and back to 1 was performed during failure on the
left and then the right engine. Both tests yield a detection rate of about 67% and no false
alarms. In Figure 8.20 and Figure 8.21, the detection is not very good while the aircraft is flying
at point 1 and accelerating to point 4. However, once at point 4, the detection is much better.
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Figure 8.20: Left Engine Mixer Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8
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Figure 8.21: Right Engine Mixer Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8
The mixer area failure applied to the flight path 1 to 2 to 6 and back to 1 has an
increased detection rate at 89% and still no false alarms. Similar to the previous plots, Figure
8.22 has a decreased detection rate at point 1 until ascension to point 2 begins. This could
mean that the mixer area does not change significantly from throttle doublets around point 1
and must be excited more by changing the Mach or altitude. Although it is desirable to detect
the failure at the time of the occurrence, at least the system does detect the failure when it
starts to affect the engine parameters.
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Figure 8.22: Left Engine Mixer Area Actuator Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6

8.4 Engine Sensor Failures
The sensor failures chosen for flight testing were the LP spool speed locked at the
minimum value; the LPT exit static pressure locked at zero and the minimum value; and the
mixer pressure ratio locked at the maximum value. These failures were chosen because they
had a visible effect of the engine parameters as shown in the Appendix.
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8.4.1 LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure
The LP spool speed failure was performed on the left engine over two flight tests. The
results are shown in Figure 8.23 and Figure 8.24. The detection rate for flight at points 1, 4, and
8 was 47% with zero false alarms. With this failure, the flight at point 1 did not seem to excite
the system enough for good detection. Also, the section with poor detection from
approximately 375sec to 700sec contains lower throttle values to fly to and at point 8.
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Figure 8.23: Left Engine LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure at 40 sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8
The detection rate shown in Figure 8.24, which includes flight at points 2 and 6, is better
at 62% with no false alarms. However, the same issues occur at point 1 and while the pilot
descends using low throttle input.
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Figure 8.24: Left Engine LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6

8.4.2 LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure
The next sensor to test was the LPT exit static pressure sensor. This failure was
performed for both a zero constant value and the minimum constant value. Figure 8.25 and
Figure 8.26 show the results of the zero constant failure. Figure 8.25 has a detection rate of
96% and false alarms of 0% for flight at points 1, 4, and 8. The flight test at points 1, 2, and 6
shown in Figure 8.26 has a smaller, but still very good, detection rate of 77% with no false
alarms.
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Figure 8.25: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Zero at 40sec for Flight Path
1 to 4 to 8
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Figure 8.26: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Zero at 40sec for Flight Path
1 to 2 to 6
Figure 8.27 and Figure 8.28 contain the results of the LPT exit static pressure sensor at
the minimum value. The first flight test has a detection rate of 90% and zero false alarms, while
the second has a detection rate of 76% and no false alarms. These results are very similar to the
zero sensor failure. For the lower rates in Figure 8.26 and Figure 8.28, the poor detection
corresponds to flight at point 6.
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Figure 8.27: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Minimum at 40sec for
Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8
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Figure 8.28: Left Engine LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure at Minimum at 40sec for
Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6

8.4.3 Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure
The final tested failure is the mixer pressure ratio sensor at a constant maximum value
found for operational point 1. The simulation of this failure suggested that it would have a
significant effect on general operation of the engine, mainly because it is connected to so many
of the other parameters – actuators and sensors. This was expected to allow for high detection
rates. Figure 8.29 and Figure 8.30 illustrate the detection results. Figure 8.29 shows the flight
test at points 1, 4, and 8 with a detection rate of 55% and 0 false alarms. The section showing
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poor detection is during deceleration to point 8 with a low throttle command. Figure 8.30 has
no false alarms and a detection rate of 47%, where the poor detection occurs at decreasing or
low throttle.
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Figure 8.29: Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 4 to 8
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Figure 8.30: Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure at 40sec for Flight Path 1 to 2 to 6
The explanation of the lower than expected detection rates for this failure is the fact
that the mixer pressure ratio is used as a detector. The mixer pressure ratio is influenced by the
most parameters in the system, which is why it was chosen as a detector. However, when the
mixer pressure ratio sensor fails and its output is constant at this high value, its effectiveness is
voided and the system has to rely on the other parameters to detect the failure. This is due to
the fact that large portions of the normal operation take place in the vicinity of this maximum
output value as can be seen in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6. Additionally, a second identifier, the
mixer area saturates at a value that is close to the normal operational point. This places the
regions of this failure very close to the self and exposed to erroneous inclusion into the self. It is
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expected that complete optimization of the detector set may succeed in better separating
these regions from the self. Even without the optimization, the detection rates shown are still
pretty good and detecting the failure immediately after its occurrence, as shown in Figure 8.30,
is very important.

8.5 Overall Performance
To better compare results of the failures tested, all of the detection rates are tabulated
in Table 8.1. As shown in the table, all of the results, with the exception of the nozzle area, have
very good detection rates and low false alarms. Even the nozzle area has an acceptable rate
over the tested flight envelope. The overall average of the false alarms including the validation
data was 0.246% which is extremely low.
Table 8.1: Results of Average Rates for Each Left Engine Failure Across the Flight Envelope

Average
Detection
Rate
Average
FalseAlarm
Rate

Nominal

Stuck
Throttle
at 0

Burner
Fuel
Flow
Valve at
0

Stuck
Nozzle
Area

Stuck
Mixer
Area

LP Spool
Speed
Sensor at
Minimum

LPT Exit
Pressure
Sensor
at 0

LPT Exit
Pressure
Sensor at
Minimum

Mixer
Pressure
Ratio
Sensor at
Maximum

N/A

83.012%

99.959%

30.908%

78.099%

54.346%

86.924%

83.417%

51.094%

0.535%

1.434%

0.246%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Some of the failure detection results can now be compared to the results from previous
research [32]. Table 8.2 shows the detection rates and false alarms for 6 different selves tested
as well as for the self developed for this thesis. The results for Self#1 through Self#6 are for a
98% engine failure for flight from 1 to 2 to 3. These selves are based on aircraft dynamic
measurements, artificial neural network state estimates, tracking errors, and artificial neural
network compensation produced by the fault tolerant adaptive control laws because no
internal engine parameters were yet modeled. The results for the new self include engine
throttle failure and engine burner fuel flow valve failure averaged over their flights for 1 to 2 to
6 and 1 to 4 to 8.
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Table 8.2: Comparison of Previous and Current Engine Model Failure Detection Rates [32]
Engine
Failure Type

98% Reduced
Efficiency

Throttle
Failure
Fuel Flow
Failure

516
504
507
504
507
515

Engine Failure
Test Data
Detection Rates
(%)
80.62
68.12
44.13
59.8
0.84
2.73

Nominal
Test Data
False Alarms
(%)
19.59
0.06
0.56
2.5
0.78
5.83

5

991

83.01

1.43

5

991

99.96

0.25

Self
Configuration

# of Self
Dimensions

Number of
Detectors

Self#1
Self#2
Self#3
Self#4
Self#5
Self#6
New Engine
Self
New Engine
Self

3
6
6
8
3
4

It is important to mention the differences and subsequent effects of the previous and
current research results. The number of detectors for the new AIS is approximately double that
of the former selves; however, an analysis in previous research showed that no significant
improvement was obtained by increasing the number of detectors in the 6 selves. The detector
set generated for the new engine model is only partially optimized; meaning further efforts
using the WVU AIS interactive design environment can improve the failure detection results.
The best two self sets from the 98% reduced efficiency engine failure were self #1 and
self #2. Self #1 had a high detection rate but also high false alarms while self #2 had low false
alarms and an acceptable detection rate. The strength of the engine failures is important when
comparing the detection results. Since the throttle failure is approximately equal to an 87%
reduced efficiency engine failure, it is a softer failure than 98% reduced efficiency, i.e. should be
harder to detect. The throttle failure average detection rate was 83% only slightly higher than
the 81% of self #1, but the false alarms for the throttle failure were much smaller. Compared to
self #2, the throttle failure has a much higher detection rate and close false alarms. The engine
burner fuel flow failure is stronger at about 113% reduced efficiency, but the detection rate is
much higher at 100% with very good false alarms. By comparing the throttle failure to the
engine burner fuel flow failure, it is apparent that reducing the strength of the failure does not
reduce the detection rate drastically. Overall, the self generated from the new engine model
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shows better detection rates and very good false alarms, and even though the engines models
are slightly different, the general conclusions are the same.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
MAPPS was used to develop a linear engine model that allows for flexibility in modeling
and detecting a variety of engine malfunctions. Integrated with the WVU F-15 model, a user is
capable of implementing new advanced engine failures in addition to previously modeled
engine failures. The failures include 7 engine actuators and 8 engine sensors each with several
options for the failure scenario.
Real-time flight data was obtained from the WVU F-15 model and the WVU 6-DOF flight
simulator where pilots performed typical maneuvers within the defined flight envelope. While
the linear engine model was valid for these experiments, some effort to create a more advance
linear model effective over a larger flight envelope and/or with full power capabilities could be
beneficial.
The WVU AIS design environment was used to develop a detection scheme which tested
the experimental flight data for engine failures. The detection scheme developed from internal
engine parameters demonstrated improvement compared to previous results. Some failures
produced excellent detection rates and false alarms while still others had very good results.
Also, the same level of robustness of the data acquisition process has been confirmed for
propulsion system malfunction as previously determined for other aircraft sub-systems. Results
could be further improved by complete optimization of detector sets, increase of the amount of
training data, and/or additional features.

90

References
1. Lichtsinder, M., Yeshayahou, L., “Jet Engine Model for Control and Real-Time Simulations”,
ASME Journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines, Vol. 128, pp 745-53 Oct. 2006
2. Bruzelius, F., Breitnolz, C., Pettersson, S., (2002). “LPV-based Gain Scheduling Technique
Applied to a Turbofan Engine Model”, Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Control Applications, Glasgow,
Scotland, UK.
3. Frederick, D. K., Garg, S., Adibhatla, S., (2000). “Turbofan Engine Control Design Using
Robust Multivariable Control Techniques”, IEEE Trans. Control Syst. Tech., 8:961-970.
4. Henrion, Reberga, Bernussou, Vary F, “Linearization and Identification of Aircraft Turbofan
Engine Models”, IFAC, 2004
5. Parker, Khary I., Guo, Ten-Heui, “Development of a Turbofan Engine Simulation in a
Graphical Simulation Environment”, NASA Technical Memorandum 2003-212543
6. Parker, Khary, I., Melcher, Kevin J., “The Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation
(MAPSS) Users’ Guide”, NASA Technical Memorandum 2004-212968
7. Moncayo, H., Perhinschi, M., Davis, J., “Immunity-Based Aircraft Failure Detection and
Identification Using an Integrated Hierarchical Multi-Self Strategy”, Proc. of AIAA Guidance,
Navigation, and Control Conference, Chicago, IL., Aug. 2009
8. Sarkar, S., Yasar, M., Gupta, S., Ray, A., Mukherjee, K., “Fault detection and isolation in
aircraft gas turbine engines. Part 2: validation on a simulation test bed”, Proc. IMechE Vol.
222 Part G: J. Aerospace Engineering, 2008
9. Gupta, S., Ray, A., Sarkar, S., Yasar, M., “Fault detection and isolation in aircraft gas turbine
engines: Part 1: underlying concept”, Proc. IMechE Vol. 222 Part G: J. Aerospace
Engineering, 2008
10. Perhinschi M. G., Napolitano M.R., Campa G., “A Simulation Environment for Design and
Testing of Aircraft Adaptive Fault-Tolerant Control Systems”, Aircraft Engineering and
Aerospace Technology: An International Journal, Vol. 80, Iss. 6 pp 620-632, Dec. 2008
11. Rauw, M.O. (1998), “FDC 1.2 – A SIMULINK Toolbox for Flight Dynamics and Control
Analysis”, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
91

12. Rassmussen, S. (2000), “Aviator Visual Design Simulator (AVDS) – User Manual”,
Rassmussen Simulation Technologies, Ltd
13. Meyer A., Van Kampen H., “X-Plane On-Line Instruction Manual”, Laminar Research Inc.,
Columbia SC, 8th edition, 2002 (www.X-Plane.com)
14. Perhinschi M. G., Napolitano M. R., “Teaching Aircraft Health Management - A SimulationBased Approach”, scheduled for publication in Computers in Education Journal, Oct.-Dec.,
2009
15. Antoniewicz, R.F., Duke, E.L. and Patterson, B.P. (1988), “User’s Manual for Interactive
LINEAR, a Fortran Program to Derive Linear Aircraft Models”, NASA Technical Paper 2835
16. Perhinschi M. G., Campa G., Napolitano M.R., Lando M., Massotti L., Fravolini M. L.,
"Modeling and Simulation of a Fault Tolerant Control System", International Journal of
Modelling and Simulation, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 1-10, Jan. 2006
17. Benson, Ted (editor), “Turbofan Engine”, July 11, 2008, NASA Glenn Research Center,
http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/aturbf.html, Retrieved Nov. 2, 2009.
18. Benjamini, E., “Immunology, A Short Course”, Wiley-Liss Publications, New York, NY, 1992.
19. Zhi-tang, L., Yao, L., Li, W. (2005), “A Novel Fuzzy Anomaly Detection Algorithm Based on
Artificial Immune System”, Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on HighPerformance Computing in Asia-Pacific Region (HPCASIA’05).
20. Dasgupta, D., and Majumdar, N., “Anomaly Detection in Multidimensional Data Using
Negative Selection Algorithm”, Proceedings of the Congress on Evolutionary Computation
CEC '02, Vol. 02, 2002, pp 1039-1044.
21. De Castro, L., Timmis, J. (2002), “Artificial Immune Systems: A Novel Paradigm to Pattern
Recognition”, In Artificial Neural Networks in Pattern Recognition , J. M. Corchado, L.
Alonso, and C. Fyfe (eds.), SOCO-2002, University of Paisley, UK, pp. 67-84, 2002.
22. Dasgupta, D., Nino, F. (2000), “Comparison of Negative and Positive Selection Algorithms in
Novel Pattern
Detection”, In the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Systems, Man and Cybernetics (SMC), Nashville.

92

23. Dasgupta, D., Forrest, S. (1996), “Novelty Detection in Time Series Data Using Ideas from
Immunology”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligent Systems, Reno,
Nevada
24. Forrest S, Perelson AS, Allen L, Cherukuri R. (1994), “Self-nonself discrimination in a
computer”, Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, IEEE
Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, pp. 202–212.
25. Gonzalez, F., Dasgupta, D., Kizma, R.(2002), “An Immunogenetic Technique to Detect
Anomalies in Network Traffic”, GECCO 2002: 1081-1088
26. Karr, C., Nishita, K., Kenneth S. (2005), “Adaptive Aircraft Flight Control Simulation Based on
an Artificial Immune System”, Applied Intelligence 23, 295–308.
27. Ko, A., Lau, H., Lau, T. (2004), “An Immuno Control Framework for Decentralized
Mechatronic Control”, ICARIS 2004, LNCS 3239, pp. 91–105.
28. KrishnaKumar, K., “Artificial Immune System Approaches for Aerospace Applications”,
Proceedings of the 41st Aerospace Sciences Meeting & Exhibit, AIAA-2003-0457, Reno,
Nevada, 2003.
29. Dasgupta, D., KrishnaKumar, K., Wong, D., and Berry, M., “Negative Selection Algorithm for
Aircraft Fault Detection”, G. Nicosia et al. (Eds.): Proceedings from the 3rd International
Conference on Artificial Immune Systems 2004, Catania, Sicily, Italy, September 13-16, 2004,
pp. 1–13.
30. Perhinschi M. G., Moncayo H., Davis J., “Integrated Framework for Aircraft Sub-System
Failure Detection, Identification, and Evaluation Based on the Artificial Immune System
Paradigm”, Proc. of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Chicago, IL,
August 2009
31. Davis J., Perhinschi M. G., Moncayo H., “Evolutionary Algorithm for Artificial Immune
System-Based Failure Detector Generation and Optimization”, accepted for publication in
AIAA Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Oct. 2009
32. Moncayo, Hever, “Immunity-Based Detection, Identification, and Evaluation of Aircraft SubSystem Failures”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, West
Virginia University, 2009

93

Appendix A
This appendix contains several more examples for engine failure responses. Each failure
has the same standard throttle input with the left failure injected at 5sec. The figures for each
failure follow.
Left Engine Power Lever Stuck at 0:

Figure A.1: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Stuck Throttle Failure (1)
A-1

Figure A.2: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Stuck Throttle Failure (2)

A-2

Figure A.3: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Stuck Throttle Failure (3)

A-3

Figure A.4: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Stuck Throttle Failure (4)

A-4

Figure A.5: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Stuck Throttle Failure (5)

A-5

Left Engine Burner Fuel Flow at 0lbm/hr:

Figure A.6: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (1)

A-6

Figure A.7: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (2)

A-7

Figure A.8: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (3)

A-8

Figure A.9: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (4)

A-9

Figure A.10: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Burner Fuel Flow Failure (5)

A-10

Left Engine Nozzle Area Locked at 200in2:

Figure A.11: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Nozzle Area Actuator Failure (1)

A-11

Figure A.12: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Nozzle Area Actuator Failure (2)

A-12

Figure A.13: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Nozzle Area Actuator Failure (3)

A-13

Figure A.14: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Nozzle Area Actuator Failure (4)

A-14

Figure A.15: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Nozzle Area Actuator Failure (5)

A-15

Left Engine Mixer Area Locked at 50in2:

Figure A.16: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Area Actuator Failure (1)

A-16

Figure A.17: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Area Actuator Failure (2)

A-17

Figure A.18: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Area Actuator Failure (3)

A-18

Figure A.19: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Area Actuator Failure (4)

A-19

Figure A.20: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Area Actuator Failure (5)

A-20

Left Engine Low-Pressure Spool Speed Sensor at Minimum of 5500RPM:

Figure A.21: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LP Spool Speed Min. Failure (1)

A-21

Figure A.22: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LP Spool Speed Min. Failure (2)

A-22

Figure A.23: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LP Spool Speed Min. Failure (3)

A-23

Figure A.24: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LP Spool Speed Min. Failure (4)

A-24

Figure A.25: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LP Spool Speed Min. Failure (5)

A-25

Left Engine High-Pressure Compressor Exit Pressure Sensor at Maximum of 135psia:

Figure A.26: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Max. Failure (1)

A-26

Figure A.27: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Max. Failure (2)

A-27

Figure A.28: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Max. Failure (3)

A-28

Figure A.29: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Max. Failure (4)

A-29

Figure A.30: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Max. Failure (5)
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Left Engine High-Pressure Compressor Exit Pressure Sensor at Minimum of 30psia:

Figure A.31: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Min. Failure (1)

A-31

Figure A.32: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Min. Failure (2)
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Figure A.33: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Min. Failure (3)
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Figure A.34: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Min. Failure (4)
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Figure A.35: Standard Throttle Input Response with a HPC Exit Pressure Min. Failure (5)
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Left Engine Low-Pressure Turbine Exit Pressure Sensor at Minimum of 13psia:

Figure A.36: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LPT Exit Pressure Min. Failure (1)
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Figure A.37: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LPT Exit Pressure Min. Failure (2)
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Figure A.38: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LPT Exit Pressure Min. Failure (3)
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Figure A.39: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LPT Exit Pressure Min. Failure (4)

A-39

Figure A.40: Standard Throttle Input Response with a LPT Exit Pressure Min. Failure (5)

A-40

Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor at Maximum of 1.09:

Figure A.41: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Max. Failure (1)
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Figure A.42: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Max. Failure (2)
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Figure A.43: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Max. Failure (3)
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Figure A.44: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Max. Failure (4)
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Figure A.45: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Max. Failure (5)
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Left Engine Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor at Minimum of 1.02:

Figure A.46: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Min. Failure (1)
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Figure A.47: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Min. Failure (2)
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Figure A.48: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Min. Failure (3)
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Figure A.49: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Min. Failure (4)
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Figure A.50: Standard Throttle Input Response with a Mixer Pressure Ratio Min. Failure (5)
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